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With a regression discontinuity design I show that the partisan identity
of the majority in the state House of Representatives has no causal eﬀect on
the tax level. This result goes against recent ﬁndings in the political economy
literature. In the state Senate I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant discontinuity in the tax
level, but I also ﬁnd a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable -
which implies that we can not interpret the discontinuity in the Senate as
a causal relation. Another contribution of the paper is to investigate under
which conditions slim majorities in the American states (as opposed to close
election) are appropriate for a regression discontinuity design. (JEL D72, H1,
H2)
1If parties play a role in policy making, one would expect their inﬂuence over
policy to be related to the number of seats they hold in the state House and Senate.
In particular, voting rules in the Legislatures make it such that a party’s inﬂuence
should change discontinuously once it has the required majority to pass or block
bills. In most Legislatures, a party with 50%+1 of the seats in either chamber has
the power to both propose, modify, and block the budget, and also to propose and
block changes to the tax level. This discontinuous change in party inﬂuence allows
us to use a regression discontinuity design to try to identify whether there is a causal
link between the majority in the Legislature and the state tax level.
The general idea of a regression discontinuity design in a political setting is that
close elections can be regarded as random (see Lee (2008)). We propose that slim
majorities in the state lower House can be regarded as random.1 Since we are focusing
on slim majorities instead of vote count, our design must pass an important test. For
a slim majority of one seat to be considered as random, at least one seat out of all
the seats won by the majority must have been won in a close election. If this is the
case, the party identity of the majority itself can be considered as random as a close
election. On the other hand, if every seat was won by a landslide majority, even an
election result that delivers a majority of 50%+1 could not be considered as random.
We have electoral return data at the state-district level and show in Section 2.2 that
slim majorities of one or two seats do satisfy the condition of having at least one or
two close district-level elections. Section 2.2 is a contribution on its own because it
allows future research to use slim majorities in the states’ Houses to identify other
causal relations of interest.
Under the identifying assumption that slim majorities can be considered as ran-
dom, we can therefore check whether there is a discontinuous increase in the tax
level at the cutoﬀ Democratic control = 50%. We deﬁne Democratic control as the
percentage of seats held by the Democratic party in the state lower House. Above
1Every state’s Legislature (except for that of Nebraska) has two legislative chambers: a state
Senate and a state House. The Senate also plays an important role in writing and approving the
budget, but, as we discuss below in Section 2.2 and 2.3, only the state House lends itself to a
regression discontinuity design.
2the cutoﬀ, the Democrats have the majority in the state House.2 If we observe a
jump in the tax level at the 50% cutoﬀ, we can assign the higher tax level to the
Democrats holding the majority, and therefore interpret the jump as a causal rela-
tionship. The identifying assumption implies that all confounding factors, observable
and unobservable, should on average be the same on both sides of the 50% cutoﬀ, so
that the diﬀerence in the outcome variable can only be attributed to the treatment
eﬀect. An interesting feature of the design is that we can test for discontinuities in
observable covariates as a way to check whether our “randomization” has worked
well. The limitation of such a design is that we are only able to identify a causal
relation locally, at the 50% cutoﬀ. The result is not generalizable to all the support.
My main result is that I ﬁnd no discontinuity in the state tax level at the cutoﬀ
Democratic control = 50%. I describe this result in Section 3. The tests I perform
indicate that the result is robust and valid as a quasi-experiment. We may therefore
interpret this result as evidence against a causal relationship between the partisan
identity of the majority in the state House and the tax level.
Even though I ﬁnd no discontinuity in the tax level at the point at which the
Democrats gain a majority in the state House, the estimates indicate a positive
relationship between the percentage of seats the Democrats hold in the state House
and the tax level. Moreover, in Section 3.4, I show that there is a positive jump
in the tax level when the Democrats gain the majority in the state Senate. But I
show in Section 2.2 and 2.3 that the percentage of Democratic seats in the Senate
is not a valid forcing variable in a regression discontinuity design. Therefore, this
positive discontinuity estimated in the Senate and the positive relationship between
the number of Democratic seats and the tax level in the House can not be interpreted
as a causal relationship. They can only be interpreted as a positive correlation
between the number of Democrats in the Legislature and the tax level.
The result in this paper contrasts with recent results in the political economy
2Some state years have independent representatives seating in the Legislature. Our data does
not allow us to identify them. This implies that if Democratic control is less than 50%, either
the Republicans have the majority (which is the most common case) or neither party has a clear
majority. All our results are robust to the alternative forcing variable: Republican control. These
results are available on request.
3literature such as Reed (2006), who ﬁnds that Democratic control over the Legisla-
ture, measured as the fraction of the ﬁve-year period in which Democrats controlled
both state chambers, has a positive impact on the tax level. Others who have
found a signiﬁcant partisan eﬀects on the size of government in the U.S. states are
Alt and Lowry (2000), Caplan (2001), Besley and Case (2003), and Warren (2009).
There has also been evidence that parties have an eﬀect on government ﬁnances
in other settings. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) also uses regression discontinuity de-
sign and ﬁnds that left-leaning Swedish local governments do spend more. Krehbiel
(1993) ﬁnds some evidence for party eﬀects in the US House, and Blais et al. (1993)
ﬁnd some evidence of party eﬀects across countries.
The results in this paper support a literature that has found no partisan eﬀects
over the public ﬁnances of the American states. Some examples are Dye (1966),
Winters (1976), Garand (1988), and Poterba (1994).3 Our paper is closely related
to Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) who also use a regression discontinuity design and
ﬁnd no evidence that the partisan identity of the Mayor has an eﬀect on government
size. This is so even though their OLS results suggested a positive correlation.
In Section 1 I present the data. In Section 2 I discuss the design and our estima-
tion methods. In Section 3 I present the main result. I discuss the results in Section
4.
1 Data
My full sample comprises 50 American states from 1960 to 2006. Most of the political,
ﬁscal, and population variables are the same as those used by Besley and Case (2003).
I have updated their sample from 1960 to 1998 with data from 1999 to 2006. The
source of the new data was the Census Bureau, Legislature websites, the website for
the National Association of State Budget Oﬃces (NASBO), and the website for the
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). To keep the sample comparable,
3The literature has also found little evidence that the Governor’s partisan identity has an eﬀect
on the tax level.Besley and Case (2003), Reed (2006), and Leigh (2008) ﬁnd no evidence that the
party identity of the Governor aﬀects the tax level.
4I focus the analysis on the states with the most common budgetary institutions: a
two-chamber Legislature, the requirement of a simple majority to pass the budget,
and a governor with line-item veto power. Nebraska is excluded from the sample
for being the only unicameral state and for having a non-partisan Legislature. I
exclude Arkansas, California, and Rhode Island, because they all require a two-third
majority in order to pass the budget, which implies a diﬀerent cutoﬀ point at 66.6%
of the seats in each chamber in the Legislature, and there is not enough data to
reliably reproduce our estimation procedure at this cutoﬀ. The states with the block
veto power are a minority and are also excluded. Their inclusion would not change
the results qualitatively.4 There is not enough data to include Alaska, Hawaii, or
Minnesota.5 My working sample has 38 states from 1960 to 2006: 1712 observations.
In my sample, the average tax level in the American states is around 5% of GDP.
The tax level is deﬁned as the sum of state income, sales, and corporate taxes divided
by state GDP. I also have data on total state expenditure, which averages at 10% of
GDP. The expenditure is also funded by locally-determined property taxes and by
Federal transfers, both of which are not under the control of the state Legislature. I
therefore choose to focus the analysis on the revenue side of the state budget. The
result in Section 3.1 is robust to using state expenditure as the dependent variable.6
I also show results with an alternative measure for the tax level: state taxes
per capita. However, taxes per capita seem to be more time dependent than tax
4In the Appendix Section A.1, Table 8, we can see that the main result is robust to the inclusion
of the states with block veto. I also show in Figure 4 in the Appendix, Section A.1, that in the
set of states with the block veto the density of the forcing variable is discontinuous at Democratic
control=50%. Democratic controlled state Houses are less frequent than Republican controlled.
Including these states may aﬀect the validity of the design. I therefore keep the states with the
block veto out of the main analysis.
5Until 1972 Minnesota had a non-partisan Legislature. Moreover, it has an unique political
system which is not deﬁned on bipartisan lines. Its Governors were either oﬃcially independent
from 1982 to 2002 or are classiﬁed as such by Brandl (2000). For a detailed account of contemporary
Minnesota political history, see Brandl (2000).
6We will abstain from discussing the role that the Federal and local governments have in state
ﬁscal policy. In particular, we are assuming away how tax rates are set in federal units that
take central government tax policy into account. For a discussion, see Klor (2005). We are also
assuming away how the partisan alignment between states and the federal government may aﬀect
federal transfer. For an empirical discussion on Spanish data, see Sol´ e-Oll´ ea and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008).
5revenues over GDP. This can be seen in Table 1. The average taxes per capita
across states in 1982-dollars during the 1960s is $330. This jumps to $574 in the
1970s and continues to increase thereafter. Taxes over GDP are much more stable
across the same period. We choose taxes over GDP as our preferred dependent
variable because it is potentially less vulnerable to outliers from the 1960s and to
comparisons of estimates from observations of diﬀerent decades. Even when using
taxes over GDP, however, the 1960s is an outlier decade. Because of this, one of the
robustness checks is to exclude this period.
Table 1: Diﬀerent measures of the states’ tax level
Measure 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
state taxes per capita (1982-dollars) 330 574 664 813 904
state taxes over state GDP (%) 4.4 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.6
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations from 1960 to 2006. Each observation
represents a state within a year. The tax level is measured as the total sum of a state’s
income, sales, and corporate taxes. Each entry is the average of all observations within
a decade.
Table 2: Political parties and the adoption of income and/or corporate taxes
State and year Majority in the House Majority in the Senate Governor
Connecticut (1970) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Florida (1972) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Illinois (1970) Republican Republican Republican
Indiana (1964) Republican Republican Democrat
Michigan (1968) Republican Republican Republican
New Hampshire (1971) Republican Republican Republican
New Jersey (1962) Democrat Republican Democrat
Maine (1970) Republican Republican Democrat
Ohio (1972) Republican Republican Democrat
Pennsylvania (1971) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Rhode Island (1970) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Note: Our sample comprises data on corporate and income tax revenue from 1960 to
2006.
6An alternative measure to tax revenues over GDP or per capita would be to look
at the tax rates themselves. I do not have data on the changes in the tax rates, so
I cannot follow such a strategy. I do have data on tax revenues, however. So if the
revenue of a certain tax goes from zero to a positive number from one year to the
next, this means a new tax has been adopted. As can be seen in Table 2, out of the
eleven states that adopted either income alone or both income and corporate taxes
in the period 1960 to 2006, ﬁve had a Democratic majority in the state House and
six had a Republican majority in the state House.
I also have data on the following variables: state population and income; the
average state property tax, which is not decided by the Legislature; the political
identity of the Governor; the partisan identity of the majority in the state Senate;
whether or not the election was a midterm election; and election turnout. I also
have data on whether the state has other institutional features that may aﬀect the
tax level: supermajority requirements for a tax increase, and tax and expenditure
limitations. I follow standard practice and check these covariates for signiﬁcant
discontinuities around Democratic control = 50%.
Finally, I have data on state legislative election returns at the state district level
from 1967 to 2003. These were provided by the ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research) and collected and organized by Carsey et al. (2008).
I was unable to ﬁnd state-district level data for the remaining years of my working
sample. Also, as Carsey et al. (2008) point out, due to various reasons, there is
about 18% of missing values for the variable that we are interested in: the margin of
victory, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the percentage of the votes that the winner
received and the percentage of the vote that the second-place candidate received in
each state district. I end up with state-district level data for 714 state-years.7
7Our working sample has 1712 observations. An observation is a state in a year. Elections,
however, only take place every two years, so we only have election results for 856 observations.
This number is the basis for a comparison with the number of observations for which we have
state-district election returns data: 714.
72 Regression discontinuity design
2.1 Design
Regression discontinuity is a quasi-experimental design. Its deﬁning characteristic
is that the probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function
of one or more underlying variables.8 The treatment, call it T, is known to depend
in a deterministic way on an observable variable, d, known as the forcing variable,
T = f (d), where d takes on a continuum of values. But there exists a known point,
d0, where the function, f (d), is discontinuous.9 The main identifying assumption
of the design is that the relation between any confounding factor and d must be
continuous at the cutoﬀ d0. If that is the case, the only variable that is diﬀerent
near both sides of the cutoﬀ is the treatment status. As a result, the discontinuity in
the outcome variable is identiﬁed as being caused only by the variation in treatment
status. One main caveat of the design is that it can only claim to identify a causal
relation locally, i.e. at the cutoﬀ.
In this paper, the forcing variable is Democratic control, and the outcome variable
is the state tax level. If the forcing variable is above 50%, the observation receives
treatment. The treatment is a Democratic controlled state House. At each period,
a state is either assigned the treatment or not. For the observations in which the
election for the state House delivered a slim majority, we argue that the assignment
of treatment was as good as random. If this is the case, diﬀerences in the average
tax level between the treated group and the control group are an estimation of the
treatment eﬀect.
8For a detailed review of the regression discontinuity in economics, see Lee and Lemieux (2009).
9More formally, the limits T + ≡ limd→d
+
0 E[T|d] and T − ≡ limd→d
−
0 E[T|d] exist and T +  = T −.
It is also assumed that the density of d is positive in the neighborhood of d0. There are two types
of discontinuity design: fuzzy and sharp. In sharp design, treatment is known to depend in a
deterministic way on some observed variables. In fuzzy design, there are also unmeasured factors
that aﬀect selection into treatment. Our case ﬁts the sharp design.
82.2 Slim Majorities and Close Elections
The regression discontinuity design in this paper is based on the idea that slim
majorities in state Legislatures can be interpreted as randomly assigned. The party
identity of the majority in a Legislature, however, is not chosen in a single state-wide
district in which the party with 50% +1 of the votes wins the majority. Instead,
each state is divided into state-districts that choose a representative to the state
Legislature by a ﬁrst-past-the-post system.10 Therefore, an important condition for
a slim majority to be considered random is that at least a few state-districts must
have had close elections themselves.
The benchmark case is a legislative election in which each party has the same
number of secure seats, only one seat is competitive. Whichever party wins that
seat, wins the majority in the legislative chamber. If that seat was decided in a close
election, then the assignment of which party holds the majority in the legislative
chamber is as random as the election for the competitive seat itself. Lee (2008) dis-
cusses why close elections can be considered as random and are therefore appropriate
for regression discontinuity designs. The rule-of-thumb deﬁnition of a close election
by Lee (2008) is an election in which the margin of victory was less than 5% of the
votes in a particular district.
In Table 3, row 1 we can see the legislative elections that delivered majorities - for
either Democrats or Republicans - of 1% of the seats (the average state House has 110
seats). In this interval, I have state-district level data for 33 election years in diﬀerent
states. In each of these legislative elections, I counted the number of seats that were
won with a margin of victory of less than 5% of the votes. In all of these 33 legislative
elections at least 1% of the seats were decided by close elections. The results in row
1 indicate that slim majorities of one or two seats can be regarded as random insofar
as the district level election in the competitive seats can be regarded as random.
This implies that the exercise of using slim majorities for a regression discontinuity
10Some states have multi-member districts. I include in the data used in Table 3 and 4 the
multi-member districts that have diﬀerent candidates for each post. I exclude from our data the
free-for-all multi-member districts, in which all candidates run together and those with the most
votes win a seat.
9design is a valid one. For majorities of one or two seats, there seems always to be
enough close election to make the result of which party gains the majority random
itself.
Table 3: Randomness condition for the state House
Democratic control Percentage of seats Number of Randomness condition
(%) that must be close elections observations (% of obs. in the interval)
49-51 1 33 100
48-52 2 59 93
47-53 3 86 83
46-54 4 117 73
45-55 5 132 67
44-56 6 161 59
43-57 7 203 53
Note: The data on election results by state district has been provided by Carsey et al.
(2008). We have election results by state district for 726 state-years. Election returns
at the state-district level are only available from 1967 to 2003, and within this periods
there is about 18% of missing values. Democratic control is deﬁned as the percentage
of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the Democrats. We
deﬁne the randomness condition for a majority in the state House to be that at least
the percentage of seats above the 50% cutoﬀ were close elections themselves at the
state-district level. We deﬁne a close election to be an election won with a margin
of victory of less than 5% of the votes. Column 4 indicates the percentage of the
observations in that interval that satisfy the condition. Let’s use row 2 as an example.
In 93% of the 59 observations with a majority of up to 52% of the seats (Democratic
or Republican) at least 2% of the district-level elections for state House representative
had a margin of victory below 5% of the votes.
The other rows in Table 3 show what happens if we look at majorities of more
seats. As an example, let’s look at a majority of, say, 53% of the seats. If at least
3% of all seats were the result of close district-level elections, then we can say that
the identity of the majority in that election satisﬁes the randomness condition. Out
of the 86 observations in that interval, 83% satisfy the condition. Note also that the
condition implies that the winner of the majority was uncertain. The condition does
not imply that the probability of gaining the majority is the same for both parties.
If, for example, the Democrats are sure to win half of the seats by a landslide, they
only need one of the close-election seats to go their way, whereas the Republicans
would need all close-election seats to go their way.
10Table 4: Randomness condition for the state Senate
Democratic control Percentage of seats Number of Randomness condition
in the Senate(%) that must be close elections observations (% of obs. in the interval)
49-51 1 19 89
48-52 2 46 86
47-53 3 73 79
46-54 4 94 71
45-55 5 130 61
44-56 6 149 56
43-57 7 176 51
Note: The data on election results by state district has been provided by Carsey et al.
(2008). We have election results by state senate districts for 679 state-years. Election
returns at the state-district level are only available from 1967 to 2003, and within
this periods there is about 18% of missing values. Democratic control in the Senate is
deﬁned as the percentage of seats in the state Senate that belong to the Democrats.
We deﬁne the randomness condition for a majority in the state House to be that at
least the percentage of seats above the 50% cutoﬀ were close elections themselves at
the state-district level. We deﬁne a close election to be an election won with a margin
of victory of less than 5% of the votes. Column 4 indicates the percentage of the
observations in that interval that satisfy the condition. Let’s use row 2 as an example.
In 86% of the 46 observations with a majority of up to 52% of the seats (Democratic
or Republican) at least 2% of the state Senate elections had a margin of victory below
5% of the votes.
11The randomness condition is deﬁned according to an arbitrary threshold that de-
ﬁnes as close an election won by a margin of victory below 5% of the votes. Diﬀerent
thresholds would imply diﬀerent values for column 4 in Table 3. The broad picture
would remain the same, however. Slim majorities of a few seats can more easily be
considered as the result of a random process than majorities of many seats.
For any given “randomness condition”, one could estimate the discontinuity with
the methods described in Section 2.4 by restricting the sample to observations that
satisfy the condition. I have experimented with this alternative. The results are
qualitatively the same. I have therefore omitted them here. They are available on
request.
In Table 4 we can see the randomness condition for the state Senates. Even in
row 1, we observe elections that do not satisfy the randomness condition. A possible
explanation for this diﬀerence between the state Senates and Houses is the sheer
number of seats. The state Houses have many more seats up for election in any
given electoral year than the state Senates. The state Houses have an average of 110
seats and all seats are contested every two years. The state Senates have an average
of 40 seats and staggered elections, and only half of the seats are contested at each
biennial election. It is easier for all of the seats in a particular election for the state
Senate to have predictable results.
2.3 Forcing Variables
As we have seen in the previous section, some slim majorities do not satisfy the
randomness condition. This is particularly a problem for the state Senates. If the
party identity of the majority is not random at the cutoﬀ, this implies that voters
can manipulate the forcing variable even at the cutoﬀ. To test for this, I check the
density of our potential forcing variables to see how they behave around the 50%
cutoﬀ.
Figure 1 suggests that voters are able to manipulate the composition of the Senate
around the cutoﬀ. In Figure 1 we can see that there are more than double the
number of observations immediately to the left of the cutoﬀ than to the right (focus
12on the bins of size 2.5). This seems to suggest that voters are able to prevent slim
Democratic majorities from controlling the state Senate. And if the voters are able
to manipulate the composition of the state Senate at the 50% cutoﬀ, we cannot
interpret slim majorities in the Senate as random.
Democratic control - Seats held in the Senate by the Democratic party (%)
































Figure 1 :Histogram of forcing variable - Democratic control in the Senate









In Figure 2 we can see that there is almost no diﬀerence between the number of
observations in a Democratic controlled House and a Republican controlled House
at the 50% cutoﬀ. Figures 2 gives us no reason to believe in the manipulation of the
composition of the lower House around the cutoﬀ.
Given what we observe in Figures 1 and 2, the only adequate forcing variable
for a regression discontinuity design is the percentage of Democratic seats in the
state House. Since, however, the House and the Senate have similar powers over the
budget, I must look into whether the political control of the state Senate may be
inﬂuencing my result. Speciﬁcally, I show that the likelihood of the state Senate being
controlled by the Democrats is continuous around the cutoﬀ at Democratic control =
50%. Therefore, my main result in Sections 3.1 can not be driven by diﬀerences in
13Democratic control - Seats held in the House by the Democratic party (%)
































Figure 2: Histogram of forcing variable - Democratic control in the House









the political control of the Senate in either side of the cutoﬀ. The interpretation of
the result in Sections 3.1 is the eﬀect of a change in the political control of the state
House keeping everything else constant, including the political control of the state
Senate and the partisan identity of the Governor.
2.4 Estimation Methods
I implement the regression discontinuity design methods following Lee and Lemieux
(2009) and Imbems and Lemieux (2008). In this section, I discuss the estimation
methods used, and I present the main result in Section 3.1.
The discontinuity at the cutoﬀ can in practice be estimated in a number of ways.
The simplest approach is just to compare the average outcomes in a small neighbor-
hood on either side of the treatment cutoﬀ. The problem with this approach is that
it may generate imprecise estimates since the regression discontinuity method is sub-
ject to a large degree of sampling variability. To rely solely on this approach would
14require a very large sample size. I present in Figure 3, Section 3.1, local averages
of the dependent variable in intervals of width 0.5. These intervals are constructed
so that the interval immediately to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ is (49.5,50]. The in-
terval immediately to the right is (50,50.5]. The local average estimates are a crude
estimate of the discontinuity, but they are a good indicator of the variability of the
data.
An equivalent but more eﬃcient method is to estimate two functions: one with
observations to the left of the cutoﬀ and one with observations to the right. The
precision of the estimate depends on how much ﬂexibility we allow the functional
form to have. One option is to impose a parametric structure; I use a third-degree
polynomial for each side of the cutoﬀ.11 The advantage of this method is that both
estimating the discontinuity and calculating the standard errors are straightforward.
One of my main concerns is that some of the results may be sensitive to the poly-
nomial degree and that this method, as opposed to a nonparametric estimate, uses
data points too far from the 50% cutoﬀ point. In Figure 3, Section 3.1, the solid line
indicates the parametrically estimated functions.
Another equivalent alternative is a nonparametric approach.12 This method does
not impose any constraints on the functional form. I follow the standard nonpara-
metric approach and use local linear regressions with a triangular kernel.13 The local
linear regression method, as argued in Hahn et al. (2001), fairs relatively better at
the boundaries than other methods and therefore is the most appropriate to use
11I have experimented with other polynomial degrees and found similar results to our main
speciﬁcation when allowing for a quartic polynomial or higher. These results are available on
request.
12By “equivalent” I mean that conditional on the sample being large enough, all three methods
should estimate the same discontinuity.
13The method is described in detail in Pagan and Ullah (1999), p.93. It consists in minimizing











where K(.) is the kernel function and h the bandwidth. Let s = xi−x
h , the triangular Kernel is
deﬁned as:
K = (1 − |s|), for s ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise.
15with regression discontinuity design. A local linear regression estimates a regression
function at a particular point by using only data within a bandwidth surrounding
this point. The kernel function gives more weight to the data that are closest to the
point being estimated.
Nonparametric results are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Imbens and Kalyararaman
(2009) propose a method to calculate an optimal bandwidth speciﬁcally for regres-
sion discontinuity design. According to their method, the optimal bandwidth in my
sample is h = 13.14 In Figure 3, Section 3.1, at each estimation point, the predicted
value by the local linear regression is denoted by ×.
For the parametric estimates of the discontinuities at the cutoﬀ, I present Huber-
White standard errors robust to clustering by state. To estimate cluster robust
standard errors for the nonparametric estimate, I use the wild cluster bootstrap.
This does not require the residuals to be i.i.d.; nor does it require each cluster to
have the same size.15 Cameron et al. (2008) use Monte Carlo simulations to show
that the wild cluster bootstrap works well, particularly when the number of clusters
is small. As we can see in all results, the theoretical cluster robust standard errors
in the parametric estimates are similar to those estimated by the wild bootstrap
procedure with a local linear regression.
14A bandwidth of 13 implies that the point immediately to the left of the cutoﬀ is estimated with
data in the interval (37, 50], and that the point immediately to the right is estimated with data in
the interval (50, 63]. Within these two intervals there are 815 observations, making up 48% of the
sample. In the Appendix, Section A.2, I have experimented with other bandwidths and the results
are robust.






















5 . We resample the residuals 1,000 times for each regression. For more on the wild
bootstrap, see Horowitz (2001).
163 Democratic Control and the Tax Level
3.1 Main Result
The forcing variable is the percentage of seats controlled by the Democratic party
in the state House, which I call Democratic control. We can see the estimates
graphically in Figure 3 and numerically in Table 5. On the y-axis, we have the state
tax level. As the percentage of seats held by the Democrats moves from the left to
the right of the 50% cutoﬀ point, the Democrats gain a majority in the state lower
House. The estimates shows no signiﬁcant discontinuity in the tax level even though
we have estimated two independent functions, each using data on only one side of the
50% cutoﬀ. This is the main result of this paper. The regression discontinuity design
indicates no causal relationship between the partisan identity of the party controlling
the state lower House and the tax level. As I mentioned in the Introduction, this
result goes against the recent literature that has looked at the question of whether
partisan identity has a causal eﬀect on the tax level in the American states (Reed
(2006)). On the other hand, this result is similar to the Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)
ﬁndings regarding American Mayors in U.S. cities.
Table 5: State tax level and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
Polynomials -0.08 - (0.30)
LLR(bandwidth 13) -0.07 -0.07 (0.25)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from
1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent
variable is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by
state GDP and is shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control
- the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belongs to the
Democrats. The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%. Row 1
shows the results for a 3-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Row 2 shows
the result for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a triangular kernel and a
bandwidth of 13. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the
polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by
state for the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws each).
17Democratic control - Seats held in the House by the Democratic party (%)


























Figure 3: State tax level and Democratic control











In Section A.2 in the Appendix, we can see that the result is robust to estimating
the local linear regression with diﬀerent bandwidths.
As I mentioned in Section 2 (see Table 1), the 1960s had a considerably lower
average tax level than the other decades. As a robustness check I exclude all of the
observations from the 1960s. I then continue and exclude one decade at a time. As
we can see in the Appendix, Section A3, the result is robust to each exclusion.
The result could also have been driven by a particular state. To accommodate
this, I also perform a robustness check excluding one state at a time. The exclusion
of no particular state changes the result. We can see this in the Appendix, Section
A.4.
I also check to see if the results in Table 5 hold with alternative measures for the
tax level. First, I use state tax revenues per capita in 1982-dollars. As in the case
with taxes over GDP in Table 5, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity. This result can
18be seen in the Appendix, Section A5. Second, I use expenditures over GDP as an
alternative dependent variable, I ﬁnd not signiﬁcant discontinuity either. This result
can be seen in the Appendix, Section A.6.
3.3 Checking the Validity of the Design
As we can see in Section 2.3, Figure 2, the number of observations on either side
of the cutoﬀ is very similar. This suggests that our forcing variable is not being
manipulated at the cutoﬀ. Another check for the validity of the design is to see
whether any other covariate is discontinuous at the 50% cutoﬀ. If this were the case,
it could indicate that the “randomization” did not work, that is, that observations
on both sides of the cutoﬀ are not similar and therefore we cannot read our results
as the lack of a causal link between Democratic control and the tax level. As we can
see in Table 6 I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity in any of the other covariates.16
Row 1 in Table 6 shows that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ are as
likely to have the Senate controlled by the Democratic party. This is an important
result. Even though the Senate role in setting the budget is as important as that of
the House, around the cutoﬀ at least, the discontinuous change in political control
comes from the House only. Row 2 shows a similar result for a variable indicating
the partisan identity of the Governor.
Finding no discontinuities in variables such as turnout and on the indicator vari-
able for midterm elections reassures us that the forcing variable is not being manip-
ulated around the cutoﬀ by voters. As Table 6 demonstrates, elections on both sides
of the cutoﬀ are equally likely to be midterm or simultaneous, and have the same
average turnout.
Discontinuities in variables such as population, income per capita, and average
local property taxes could indicate that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ are
not comparable. But because we do not ﬁnd any discontinuity in these variables, as
can be seen in Table 6, we are conﬁdent that the design has worked well.
16In Table 6 we only show the results for the parametric speciﬁcation. The nonparametric spec-
iﬁcation give the same result. These are available on request.
19Table 6: Covariates and Democratic Control - States with the line-item veto
Variable Jump at 50% SE
Democratic control Senate 0.02 (0.12)
Democratic Governor -0.01 (0.15)
Turnout -0.02 (0.03)
Midterm election 0.09 (0.09)
Population 0.76 (1.25)
Income per capita 1.21 (1.13)
Local property taxes 0.21 (0.25)
Tax and expenditure limitations 0.09 (0.11)
Supermajority requirements 0.02 (0.07)
State tax level lagged twice 0.04 (0.30)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from
1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. Democratic control
Senate takes value 1 if the state Senate is controlled by the Democratic party, and
value 0 otherwise. Democratic Governor takes value 1 if the Governor is a Democrat,
and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned as the fraction of the population that
turned out to vote in the last election. Midterm election takes value 1 if the election
for that observation was a midterm election, and 0 if the Governor was also chosen in
that election. Population is the state population in millions for a given year. Income
per capita is the state income per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Local property
taxes is the percentage of a state average property tax in a year divided by state GDP.
Tax and expenditure limitations takes value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule
in that year, and value 0 otherwise. Supermajority requirements takes value 1 if the
state in that year requires a supermajority to vote for a tax increase. The forcing
variable is Democratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belongs to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated
at Democratic control = 50% with a 3-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
20In row 8 of Table 6 I look at an institutional feature that has been adopted by
some of the states in our sample: tax and expenditure limitations. The majority of
these limitations restrict expenditure growth to increases in income per capita or,
in some cases, to inﬂation and population growth. Some of these limitations also
restrict the size of appropriations to a percentage of state income; whereas some
have statutory bounds on expenditure growth rates.17 I use an indicator variable
that takes value 1 should such a rule be in place within a state during that year,
and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 6 the incidence of observations with such rules
is on average similar on both sides of the cutoﬀ. The same is true in row 9 for the
incidence of another institutional feature: super majority requirements.18
In Row 10, I treat the lagged tax level as another covariate. I lag the tax level
twice. This means that for an observation at the current year t, I look at the tax
level at year t−2. I do so because of the nature of the data. Each election cycle for
the state House of representatives is two years. The political variables therefore only
change every two years, whereas the tax level changes every year. This means that
regressing the current Democratic control on the tax level lagged once (t − 1) will
for half of our observations be the same as regressing the current Democratic control
on the current tax level. Such an estimation would be partly a repetition of the
contemporaneous regression and therefore would not be a good test of the validity
of the design. Finding no discontinuity in the lagged tax level is an indication that
the design works well, and that we can interpret the lack of a contemporaneous
discontinuity in the tax level as the lack of a causal relationship between Democratic
control and the tax level.
17For more details, see Waisanen (2008).
18In principle, when such a requirement is adopted, it is no longer enough to hold 50% of seats
to formally raise the tax level, which makes dealing with the observations that have supermajority
requirements more problematic than dealing with other covariates. One option for dealing with the
240 observations with supermajority requirements is to drop them entirely, which does not change
the results. These results are available on request. Another option would be to deﬁne the forcing
variable as the distance from the cutoﬀ so that the 66.6% cutoﬀ is pooled with the 50% cutoﬀ.
However, in the states with supermajority requirements, the budget is still approved by a simple
majority. The two cutoﬀ points are not directly comparable. I prefer to keep the observations with
supermajority requirements and treat it as another covariate. For an analysis of their adoption and
the eﬀect on the tax level, see Knight (2000).
213.4 Senate
The interpretation of the result in Section 3.1 as the lack of a causal relationship
between partisan political control and the tax level hinges on the assumption that
representatives will vote according to party lines, particularly in budget matters. If
representatives do not vote according to party lines our results may simply express
that parties are weak.19
In Table 7, however, we can see that Democratic control over the state Senate is
positively correlated with the tax level. A Democratic controlled Senate implies a
10% increase in the the state tax level. As I have mentioned before this result can
not be interpreted as a causal relationship,20 but it suggests that parties do have an
inﬂuence over the tax level, even if this inﬂuence is determined by an unobservable
variable such as preferences.
The positive correlation between Democratic control and the tax level can be seen
not only in Table 7, but also in Figure 3, where the estimates indicate an increasing
function between Democratic control and the tax level. Both of these results suggest
that there is indeed a positive correlation between Democratic political control and
the tax level. This relationship, however, can not be interpreted as causal.
19Political scientists tend to agree that parties inﬂuence the policy making process. They dis-
agree on the mechanisms, strength, and domain of this inﬂuence. An example of this can be seen in
Wright and Schaﬀner (2002), who compare the unicameral non-partisan Nebraska legislature with
the Kansas Senate. They claim that these two chambers are comparable in almost all aspects,
with the exception of Nebraska being oﬃcially run as non-partisan. Wright and Schaﬀner (2002)
use roll-call data from 1996 to 1998 to determine the ideological location of each representative
in a spatial voting model. They also ﬁnd that although the main dimension, usually identiﬁed
with a liberal-conservative line, does well in predicting how the partisan senators in Kansas will
vote, it does not help to predict how the non-partisan members of the Nebraska legislature will
vote. Wright and Schaﬀner (2002) conclude that this is an indication of the inﬂuence of parties on
representatives’ behavior. Similarly, Aldrich and Battista (2002) look at roll-call data and spatial
analysis in order to measure the polarization of diﬀerent state legislatures. They ﬁnd a strong posi-
tive relationship between slim majorities and the more polarized Legislatures. Aldrich and Battista
(2002) ﬁnding is important for the purposes of this paper, as the assumption that representatives
vote according to party line has to hold around the 50% cutoﬀ point in particular.
20See Section 2.2 and 2.3.
22Table 7: State tax level and Democratic control in the Senate
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
Polynomials 0.76 - (0.31)**
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.51 0.55 (0.35)
LLR(bandwidth 8) 0.58 0.56 (0.28)**
LLR(bandwidth 13) 0.52 0.52 (0.22)**
LLR(bandwidth 18) 0.50 0.49 (0.23)**
LLR(bandwidth 20) 0.52 0.46 (0.22)**
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from
1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent vari-
able is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state
GDP and is shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control - the
percentage of seats in the state Senate that belongs to the Democrats. The discontinu-
ity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 3-degree
polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Rows 2-6 shows the result for a local linear
regression speciﬁcation with a triangular kernel and varying bandwidth. Theoretical
cluster robust standard errors are provided for the polynomial regression together with
bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for the nonparametric regression
(wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws each).
4 Concluding remarks
The results in this paper are in line with the results of Lee et al. (2004), who ﬁnd that
voters elect policy instead of aﬀecting policy choices by politicians. If voters want
a bigger government they will vote for the people who will implement it. In a close
election however, under the identifying assumption of the regression discontinuity
design, voters’s preferences are on average the same whether the Democrats have the
majority or not. And as we have seen, there is no discontinuity in the tax level around
the cutoﬀ Democratic control=50%. This result supports the preference hypothesis
put forward by Krehbiel (1993) over the party hypothesis. When the preferences are
held ﬁxed, party identity has no eﬀect on the size of government.
In the state Senate we do observe a jump in the tax level when the Democrats
have a majority - this is the case even when the Democrats gain the majority. But
since we have seen that the design is not valid for the state Senates, we can not infer
that voters’ preferences are the same on both sides of the cutoﬀ. Voters seem able
to manipulate their choice at the cutoﬀ and therefore the may choose a Democratic
23majority for the Senate when they want a bigger government. In this case we can
not distinguish between the preference and party hypothesis.
The results presented here for the American states are similar to Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009)’s for the American cities. Even though both papers observe a positive corre-
lation between democratic inﬂuence and the tax level, the relationship is not causal.
If parties do not inﬂuence the size of government, what do they do? Glaeser and Ward
(2006), for example, argue that partisan diﬀerences are mostly based on religion and
culture and less oriented along economic issues. On similar lines, de Magalh˜ aes and Ferrero
(2011) propose a model for the American states in which parties exist but have no
preferences over the size of government per se - parties are only interested in max-
imizing the utility of their supporters. I their model the tax level is not driven by
partisan identity but by the degree of alignment between the Governor and the Leg-
islature. They show that such a model is able to explain the empirical relationship
between political control of the Legislature and the tax level.
24A Robustness Check
A.1 Democratic Control and the State Tax Level: All States
Democratic control - Seats held in the House by the Democratic party (%)
































Figure 4: Histogram - Democratic control in the House - States with the Block Veto










25Table 8: State tax level, Covariates, and Democratic Control: all states
Variable Jump at 50% SE
State tax level -0.32 (0.27)
State taxes per capita 8.82 (67.93)
Democratic control Senate -0.01 (0.11)
Democratic Governor 0.03 (0.12)
Turnout -0.01 (0.02)
Midterm election 0.08 (0.09)
Population 0.84 (1.08)
Income per capita 0.89 (0.91)
Local property taxes 0.19 (0.24)
Tax and expenditure limitations 0.06 (0.09)
Supermajority requirements 0.02 (0.06)
State tax level lagged twice -0.22 (0.28)
Note: This sample comprises 2004 observations of states with both the line item veto
and the block veto from 1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a
year. State tax level is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes
divided by state GDP in percentage terms. State taxes per capita is the total sum of a
state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in 1982-dollars. Democratic con-
trol Senate takes value 1 if the state Senate is controlled by the Democratic party, and
value 0 otherwise. Democratic Governor takes value 1 if the Governor is a Democrat,
and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned as the fraction of the population that turned
out to vote in the last election. Midterm election takes value 1 if the election for that
observation was a midterm election, and value 0 if the Governor was also chosen in
that election. Population is the state population in millions for a given year. Income
per capita is the state income per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Local property
taxes is the percentage of a state average property tax in a year divided by state GDP.
Tax and expenditure limitations takes value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule
on that year, and value 0 otherwise. Supermajority requirements takes the value 1 if
the state in that year requires a supermajority to vote a tax increase. The forcing
variable is Democratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belongs to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated
at Democratic control = 50% with a 3-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
26A.2 Alternative bandwidths
Table 9: State tax level and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.11 0.06 (0.34)
LLR(bandwidth 8) 0.04 -0.06 (0.28)
LLR(bandwidth 13) -0.07 -0.07 (0.25)
LLR(bandwidth 18) -0.05 -0.04 (0.22)
LLR(bandwidth 20) -0.04 -0.02 (0.22)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from
1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent
variable is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by
state GDP and is shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control
- the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belongs to the
Democrats. The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%. Rows one
and two show the result for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a triangular ker-
nel and varying bandwidth. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for
the polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors
by state for the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws each).
27A.3 Excluding decades
Table 10: Tax level and Democratic control: one decade excluded at a time






Note: This sample comprises state-years with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006.
We exclude one decade at a time. Each regression is run with 1369, 1342, 1342,
1346, and 1449 observations, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage
of the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and
shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control, the percentage
of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the Democratic party.
The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%. Each row shows the
results for a 3-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust
standard errors by state are in parentheses.
28A.4 Excluding One State at a Time
Table 11: Tax level and Democratic control: one state excluded at a time
Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE Excluded Jump at 50% SE
AL -0.08 (0.30) AZ -0.13 (0.29)
CO -0.04 (0.30) CT -0.02 (0.29)
DE -0.08 (0.30) FL -0.11 (0.30)
GA -0.10 (0.30) IA -0.04 (0.30)
IL -0.18 (0.30) KS -0.10 (0.30)
KY -0.05 (0.30) LA -0.07 (0.30)
MA -0.14 (0.29) MD -0.09 (0.30)
MI -0.19 (0.30) MO -0.18 (0.29)
MS -0.03 (0.30) MT -0.13 (0.31)
ND -0.03 (0.29) NJ -0.17 (0.29)
NM -0.01 (0.29) NY -0.02 (0.29)
OH -0.08 (0.30) OK -0.10 (0.30)
OR 0.00 (0.29) PA -0.05 (0.33)
SC -0.11 (0.30) SD -0.11 (0.30)
TN -0.08 (0.30) TX -0.03 (0.29)
UT -0.06 (0.30) VA -0.07 (0.30)
WA -0.07 (0.31) WI -0.07 (0.31)
WV -0.05 (0.30) WY -0.08 (0.30)
Note: This sample comprises state-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. Each
regression is run with 1665 observations. The ﬁrst exception is the regressionexcluding
Connecticut, that has 1669 observations, as Connecticut had fours years with an
independent Governor dropped. The regressions excluding Iowa, Washington and
West Virginia have 1674 observations each, as these states adopted the line item veto
in 1969. The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of income, sales, and
corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The
forcing variable is Democratic control, the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated
at Democratic control =5 0%. In each entry, we exclude from the sample the state in
columns 1 or 3. Each row shows the results for a 3-degree polynomial on each side of
the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
29A.5 Alternative Measure: State Taxes Per Capita
Table 12: Taxes per capita and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
Polynomials 55.13 - (82.56)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 37.75 33.90 (64.88)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from
1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent
variable is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in
1982-dollars. The forcing variable is Democratic control, which is the percentage of
seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the Democratic party. The
discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for
a 3-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster robust standard
errors are provided for the polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-
robust standard errors by state for the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with
10,000 draws each).
A.6 Alternative Measure: State Expenditures over GDP
Table 13: Taxes per capita and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
Polynomials -0.01 - (0.56)
LLR(bandwidth 12) -0.44 -0.32 (0.57)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto
from 1960 to 1998. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent
variable is total state expenditure divided by state GDP. The forcing variable is Demo-
cratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic
control = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 2-degree polynomial on each side of
the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the polynomial
regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for the
nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
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